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Abstract
Philosophical treatments of natural kinds are embedded in two distinct projects. 
I call these the philosophy of science approach and the philosophy of language 
approach. Each is characterized by its own set of philosophical questions, con-
cerns, and assumptions. The kinds studied in the philosophy of science approach 
are projectible categories that can ground inductive inferences and scientific expla-
nation. The kinds studied in the philosophy of language approach are the referen-
tial objects of a special linguistic category—natural kind terms—thought to refer 
directly. Philosophers may hope for a unified account addresses both sets of con-
cerns. This paper argues that this cannot be done successfully. No single account can 
satisfy both the semantic objectives of the philosophy of language approach and the 
explanatory projects of the philosophy of science approach. After analyzing where 
the tensions arise, I make recommendations about assumptions and projects that are 
best abandoned, those that should be retained, and those that should go their sepa-
rate ways. I also recommend adopting the disambiguating terminology of “scientific 
kinds” and “natural kinds” for the different notions of kinds developed in these dif-
ferent approaches.
Keywords Natural kinds · Scientific kinds · Homeostatic property cluster kinds · 
Natural kind terms · Pluralism · Essentialism · Realism · Rigid designation
1 Introduction
A philosophical approach to natural kinds is motivated by a family of questions, 
concerns, and assumptions that influence the nature of the accounts generated. The 
philosophy of language approach starts with the widely embraced “direct reference 
theory” of natural kind terms of the sort introduced by Kripke (1980) and Putnam 
(1975). It is more or less assumed that some version of a direct reference theory 
based on Kripke’s “picture” is correct. The task for the theory of natural kinds then, 
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is to determine what natural kinds need to be like for a direct reference theory to 
work. The philosophy of language approach generates accounts of natural kinds 
characterized by metaphysical structures to which natural kind terms can directly 
refer. The philosophy of science approach focuses on the epistemological role of 
kinds in scientific investigations, how kinds are grounded in the causal structure 
of the world, how kinds can support inductive inferences, explanations, and causal 
interventions, and how working scientists do and should approach classification gen-
erally. The accounts of natural kinds generated in this approach tend to be domain-
relative and pluralistic in order to accommodate the inductive and explanatory suc-
cess of a variety of scientific practices. As a consequence, I argue, they do not have 
the sort of metaphysical structures that could ground a direct reference theory. This 
is not to say that they are ontologically inferior to the natural kinds of the philoso-
phy of language approach, but that they cannot play the role of being the referen-
tial objects of “natural kind terms”, as understood in the philosophy of language 
approach. While philosophers may hope for a unified account of natural kinds, this 
paper argues that the kinds of these two approaches are distinct and that no sin-
gle account can satisfy both the semantic objectives of the philosophy of language 
approach and the explanatory projects of the philosophy of science approach. After 
analyzing where the tensions arise, I make recommendations about assumptions and 
projects that are best abandoned, those that should be retained, and those that should 
go their separate ways.
Hacking (2007) claims that contemporary philosophers use the term “natural 
kind” in so many ways that it no longer refers to any well-defined class. He believes 
the literature has devolved into a “scholastic twilight” from the “heady days of the 
1970s when Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam did so much to give sense and use to 
the idea of a natural kind” (p. 227). In my view the contemporary literature has 
accomplished a great deal. It is, however, bifurcated, and does not always display 
awareness of this bifurcation. If I am right, a terminological clarification is in order, 
so as to avoid using one term “natural kind” for different things. I will use what I 
take to be an appropriate terminological clarification at the beginning of my argu-
ment rather than at the end. The camp that will get new terminology is the phi-
losophy of science camp. This is in part due to precedent. Some philosophers of 
science have preferred to step away from the “natural” label with its metaphysical 
connotations and talk about “investigative kinds,” or just “kinds.”1 “Explanatory 
kinds” or “epistemic kinds” might serve as well. So as not to appear to treat these as 
second-class kinds, I call them “scientific kinds” which hopefully connotes as much 
ontological seriousness as “natural”.2 Because I think there remains a role for some 
1 See Brigandt (2003) and Griffiths (2004). Hacking (2007) and Betzler (forthcoming) suggest that omit-
ting mention of “natural” kinds will clarify discussions of classification in science. Ludwig (2018) rec-
ommends dropping the notion of “natural kind” entirely, along with the attempt to develop a general 
notion of natural kind.
2 My attempts to remain consistent with this usage create some awkwardness in the explication of some 
accounts that retain the term “natural kind.” Khalidi (2013), for example, argues that because scientific 
kinds track real causal networks, they deserve to be called “natural kinds.” Chang (2016) uses the label 
“natural,” insisting that his account is naturalistic, even while nature is “framed by human perceptual and 
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metaphysical structures characteristic of the kinds of the philosophy of language 
approach, and because of wide-spread usage, I will leave to them the name “natural 
kinds”. I will use “natural kind term” for terms purported to have the distinctive 
dual-level semantics postulated by the direct reference theory, whereby we identify 
members of a kind by one set of (normally observable) features, but the term refers 
to underlying (often unknown) features.
The contemporary literature in which I am interested is quite large and spans 
roughly four decades. I do not intend to provide an exhaustive survey, nor to dis-
cuss every important contribution. I do intend to discuss representative examples 
drawn from each approach; these are contributions that I think highlight the relevant 
issues.3 My expositions of the two approaches are not in parallel. This reflects some 
of the differences between them. I see the philosophy of science approach as moti-
vated by a certain kind of project—that of understanding the roles of classification 
in scientific practices. In the contemporary literature, Boyd has been instrumental 
in getting this project off the ground, and so my exposition starts with Boyd. I see 
the philosophy of language approach as starting with a set of assumptions about 
natural kind terms—that they are nondescriptional rigid designators whose ref-
erence is secured causally. My exposition starts with these assumptions and then 
works through the different versions of essentialism that are adopted to explain rigid 
designation.
2  The philosophy of science approach
The Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) account, introduced by Boyd (1989, 1990, 
1991), is the most prominent and influential in the philosophy of science approach. 
In the last 30 years, it has been amended and modified, by Boyd as well others. A 
central motivation for the HPC account was to accommodate the natural kind-ness 
of biological species, for which essentialist claims seemed implausible. While there 
is no set of properties necessary and sufficient for belonging to a species, there are 
clusters of properties that tend to co-occur in homeostasis, and their homeostatic 
co-occurrences are often explained by underlying mechanisms. For the early Boyd 
(1989, 1991), the direct reference theory for natural kind terms was fully incorpo-
rated into the HPC account. Natural kind terms have a posteriori definitions rather 
3 My classification of the philosophical literature is imperfect and may have unexpected results. LaPorte 
(2004, 2013) falls into the philosophy of language approach, even while modifying the standard view in 
light of a more informed picture of biological practices. Boyd (1989, 1991, 1999, 2010, 2021) falls into 
the philosophy of science approach even while concerns about reference remain central to his account. 
Ellis (2001) is hard to classify, as he claims to be not interested in theory of reference, but in the “scien-
tific practice of theoretical identification” (p. 54). Yet his account is starkly different from others in the 
philosophy of science approach. See Beebee and Sarbbarton-Leary (2010) for an argument that Ellis, 
despite his focus on scientific classification, is “up to his neck in Kripkean commitments” (p. 175).





than definitions established stipulatively by convention. Such definitions consist of 
property clusters together with any underlying mechanisms that maintain the clus-
ters in homeostasis. Because we determine through scientific investigation which 
property clusters and underlying mechanisms belong in our species definitions, the 
account appears to fit nicely with the “dual-level” semantics of natural kind terms 
(discussed in the next section). That is, we identify members of a kind by observ-
able features, but kind terms refer in virtue of discoverable but often undiscovered 
properties.
At the same time, explanation and induction are central to Boyd’s account. The 
properties and mechanisms that belong in a kind definition do so because of their 
inductive and explanatory significance. According to Boyd (1999) “It is a truism that 
the philosophical theory of natural kinds is about how classificatory schemes come 
to contribute to the epistemic reliability of inductive and explanatory practices” (p. 
146). This places Boyd squarely in my philosophy of science approach, despite his 
continuing concerns about reference. Moreover, as Boyd and other Boyd-inspired 
philosophers have developed accounts of scientific kinds, these accounts become 
increasingly disengaged from anything like a dogmatic commitment to the Direct 
Reference Theory. Boyd (1999, 2010, 2021) replaces his apparent earlier acceptance 
of a direct reference theory with his Accommodationist Theory: classificatory terms 
can effectively contribute to epistemically reliable inductive and explanatory prac-
tices only if those terms accommodate the causal powers of the phenomena stud-
ied by those practices. For Boyd (2010) “The accommodationist conception entails 
that descriptive, conceptual, and intentional factors figure fundamentally in estab-
lishing reference to natural kinds” (p. 223). Thus the later Boyd appears to adopt 
descriptivism. He maintains that the Accommodationist Theory is a causal theory 
since human conceptions and intentions are as much a part of the causal order as 
anything. His idea is that we can’t separate our scientific usage of kind terms from 
the “disciplinary matrices” in which they are embedded. A disciplinary matrix is a 
family of methods, theories, concepts, and practices that inform a range of relevant 
questions and phenomena of interest. The conceptual background and specification 
of relevant questions and phenomena provided by a disciplinary matrix inform the 
content of scientific kind terms in ways that make essential contributions to refer-
ence. While most contributors to the philosophy of science approach don’t address 
semantic issues to the extent that Boyd does, the idea of relativizing scientific kinds 
to domains of inquiry appears repeatedly. Once that idea is taken seriously, plural-
ism about kinds becomes plausible, since different classification schemes are appro-
priate to different domains of inquiry. Below I discuss several additional contribu-
tions to the philosophy of science approach (including recent work from Boyd) that 
de-emphasize the role of underlying mechanisms, relativize kinds to domains of 
inquiry, and are pluralistic with respect to scientific kinds.
Craver (2009) argues against the idea that mechanisms constitute the causal struc-
ture of the world in such a way that successful kind concepts track causal mecha-
nisms and thereby carve nature at its joints (p. 575). The view that concerns Craver 
is a realist account of kinds that is also compatible with direct reference theories: we 
can identify members of a kind by an observable cluster of properties, but the refer-
ence of a kind term is determined by underlying mechanisms, which are independent 
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of conventional ways of sorting into kinds.4 Craver objects that underlying mech-
anisms cannot carve out objective causal structures in the world because for any 
property cluster there is a variety of mechanisms in which it participates, including 
proximal and distal causal mechanisms, as well as the mechanisms that sustain the 
cluster. Craver writes: “one can be led to lump or split the same putative kind in 
different ways depending on which mechanism one consults in accommodating the 
taxonomy to the mechanistic structure of the world” (p. 583). Craver further argues 
that mechanisms can’t play the role of individuating scientific kinds because mecha-
nisms can themselves only be individuated relative to the purpose of the taxonomy 
for which they are employed. This is because both the boundaries between mecha-
nisms and the level of abstraction at which they are characterized vary depending 
on what is needed for prediction, explanation, and control of various phenomena 
that scientists investigate. As there are no grounds for privileging one type or level 
of mechanism over others, recognizing a plurality of mechanisms leads to pluralism 
about scientific kinds. While a good scientific taxonomy needs to accommodate real 
causal structures in the world, it also will be responsive to the aims of the particular 
scientific enterprise in which it is embedded—what questions are asked, what phe-
nomena are to be explained, what sort of interventions are relevant, and so forth (cf. 
Boyd’s disciplinary matrices). Craver suggests a “simple causal theory” of scientific 
kinds that does not attempt to use underlying mechanisms to individuate kinds, and 
that is explicitly pluralistic.
Khalidi (2013) picks up on Craver’s idea of a simple causal theory. For Khalidi, 
an account of scientific kinds should elucidate their role in explanation and induc-
tive inference, and show how scientific kinds are projectible. Importantly, it should 
apply to special science kinds, which track causal patterns as much as do funda-
mental science kinds. For Khalidi, scientific kinds are “nodes in causal networks” 
(p. 200), characterized by a few central properties, such that when instantiated, they 
cause the instantiation of further properties. Khalidi argues that while there may be 
cases in which a mechanism serves to hold the network of properties together, there 
is often no single mechanism that does this, and the properties in the network don’t 
necessarily need to be in homeostasis. What is necessary for scientific kinds is that 
they are projectible in such a way that we can make reliable inferences (including 
probabilistic ones) about members of a kind. Khalidi maintains that a simple causal 
theory makes more sense of special science kinds, in part because many special sci-
ence kinds are multiply realizable. For example, Khalidi explores in detail the prop-
erty viscosity and the kind Newtonian fluid from the field of fluid mechanics (pp. 
82–92). Viscosity features in laws characterized at the macroscopic level (e.g., Fick’s 
first law of diffusion, which incorporates the concepts of diffusion and concentra-
tion), though it is realized in different ways in liquids (chemical bonds), gasses (den-
sity and temperature), and porous solids (dimensions of pores). The kind Newtonian 
4 While Craver is concerned with the role of mechanisms in individuating kinds, his primary target is not 
necessarily Boyd, since Boyd does not think underlying mechanisms are always necessary for a property 
cluster to remain in homeostasis; nor is Boyd’s realism of the kind articulated here. Nonetheless, it is an 
important idea, and a tempting one for a realist of this sort to take as the import of an HPC account.
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fluid is defined as a fluid with a constant viscosity; it includes substances whose vis-
cosity is realized in these different ways. Thus there is no common micro-structural 
mechanism that unifies the kind Newtonian fluid. Rather, it is unified by the substan-
tial generalizations that apply to it and its consequent projectibility.5
Ereshefsky and Reydon (2015) make a similar move in their acceptance of func-
tional kinds, such as kinds of genes, which are characterized as DNA sequences 
that function in the production of molecular expression products. Because DNA 
sequences are often involved in multiple expression products, because the same 
DNA sequence may function in different ways (or not at all) in different organisms, 
and because several disconnected DNA sequences are often involved in a particu-
lar expression product, Ereshefshy and Reydon argue that “there is no unique map-
ping of molecular expression products onto DNA sequences” (p. 975). Genes are 
functionally defined kinds that nonetheless feature in non-trivial generalizations. For 
Ereshefsky and Reydon, scientific kinds are characterized in terms of the classifica-
tory programs that generate them. Their account specifies necessary and sufficient 
conditions for classificatory programs to generate scientific kinds. Such a program 
would need to have both “sorting principles” and “motivating principles” where the 
motivating principles embody the purposes of the program’s classification system 
and justify its sorting principles. The sorting principles in turn need to successfully 
promote the motivating principles. Second, either the sorting principles or the moti-
vating principles would need to be empirically testable. Third, the program would 
need to be not degenerative relative to competing classificatory programs. That is, 
it ought to “produce additional classifications or extend existing classifications…
and those classifications are empirically successful” (p. 982). This account is disci-
pline-relative in that it recognizes scientific kinds by the sort of research programs 
in which they are embedded. This is a fairly permissive account, since there is con-
siderable flexibility with respect to what counts as a scientific kind, including kinds 
characterized by function rather than by mechanisms or micro-structural properties.
Slater (2015) defends a “stable property cluster” (SPC) account according to 
which scientific kinds are characterized by property clusters that are “sufficiently 
stably coinstantiated to accommodate the inferential and explanatory uses to which 
particular sciences put such categories” (p. 396). This is meant as a modification of 
the HPC account that can apply more generally to scientific kinds, since underlying 
mechanisms are not needed for scientific kinds to be projectible and explanatory. 
It is also explicitly domain and context sensitive. For any area of scientific inquiry, 
only certain stable property clusters will be relevant to its inferential and explana-
tory projects. For this reason, Slater accepts a kind of pluralism, and sees little pros-
pect that SPC kinds will carve nature along a single objective set of joints. There is 
no single set of stable property clusters to be carved. Nonetheless, for Slater, SPC 
5 Khalidi’s argument here is a response to those of Kim (1992) and Shapiro (2000) that if a kind is 
multiply realizable, it ought to be counted as multiple kinds because the broader kind will not feature in 
genuine, non-trivial laws and generalizations. See also Polger and Shapiro (2016) for further develop-
ment of this line of argument against multiple realizability.
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kinds are “genuine features of the world” (p. 407) that various domains of inquiry 
use to facilitate and organize epistemic contact with the world.
Chang (2016) approaches kinds from the Boydian tradition in the sense of reject-
ing classical essentialism and focusing on how kinds operate in science. He rejects 
the idea that scientific kinds are independent of human cognition and practices, on 
the grounds that scientific inquiry is itself a human enterprise. For Chang, a scien-
tific kind is a classificatory concept that is “sufficiently effective in aiding inquiry 
in the natural sciences” (p. 42). This is an even looser definition than those we 
have seen so far; it embraces domain sensitivity and pluralism, to the extent that 
it acknowledges the usefulness, for certain domains of inquiry, of categories that 
have been abandoned by modern science. Phlogiston was a perfectly good scientific 
kind in the domain of inquiry in which it was embedded.6 It did in fact aid scien-
tific inquiry, and it could have developed into a modern scientific kind concept had 
certain lines of inquiry not been abandoned. I take a consequence of this to be that 
had chemical history gone differently, today’s direct reference theorists would be 
happily asserting that the essence of phlogiston is easy-to-remove electrons, and that 
the term “phlogiston” was able to refer to such electrons when it was introduced as 
the substance that enabled combustion. But in the actual history, “phlogiston” never 
developed into a concept precise enough to designate easy-to-remove electrons, so 
the term did not refer to such electrons when it was introduced. Chang (2012) sug-
gests that in a counter-factual history of chemistry the concept of phlogiston splits 
into one corresponding to the contemporary notion of chemical potential energy and 
another corresponding to electrons (pp. 47–48). Chang’s scientific kinds are kinds 
that aid scientific inquiry, and are not characterized by any particular metaphysical 
structure. Like Chang, Magnus (2012) drops the idea that scientific kinds need to be 
tied to causal structures. Rather, they are domain-sensitive categories that allow sci-
entific inquiry to achieve inductive and explanatory success (p. 48). For both Chang 
and Magnus, scientific kinds are descriptive categories that don’t necessarily refer to 
causal structures. If they help to further inquiry, they count as scientific kinds.
Recent work by Boyd (2021) offers a general account of philosophically and sci-
entifically significant kinds that are “manifestations of the ways in which the use of 
classificatory terms and concepts contributes to the accommodation of the inferen-
tial architectures of scientific (and other) disciplines to relevant causal structures” 
(pp. S2887–S2888). HPC kinds are but one category in this broader notion of a sci-
entific kind. Thus so long as kind concepts help to guide our disciplinary practices 
toward a better alignment with relevant causal structures, they fall under this broader 
notion of scientific kind. This presumably applies to concepts like Chang’s phlogis-
ton, that (at least for a while) are not tied to any actual causal structures. It should 
also be broad enough to include functional and multiply realizable kinds like Newto-
nian fluid or kinds of genes.
6 Chang uses the terminology “natural kind” throughout. To my ear, Chang’s view sounds less startling 
with the change in terminology. I think it helps to remove the metaphysical connotations associated with 
the claim that phlogiston is a “natural kind.”
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The discipline-relativity that appears repeatedly in these accounts of scientific 
kinds entails some manner of pluralism, since different classification schemes will 
be appropriate to different disciplines. It also entails some crosscutting kinds, since 
the classification schemes in different disciplines will focus on different phenom-
ena. Khalidi (2013), for example, explicitly defends crosscutting kinds, noting that 
they are “ubiquitous in the sciences” (p. 70). In the special sciences in particular, 
identifying causal patterns that are explanatory of relevant phenomena “requires 
ignoring certain dissimilarities or focusing on certain aspects of causal reality to the 
exclusion of others” (p. 129). At the same time, there is a near uniformity (across 
both approaches, in fact) in professing realism with respect to kinds. The realism 
embraced in the philosophy of science approach rejects (sometimes explicitly) 
the idea that realism requires mind-independence.7 The role of scientific kinds in 
explaining the inductive and explanatory success of science, as well as the connec-
tion (in many cases at least) between classificatory concepts and causal structures 
in the world, is thought to be adequate grounds for realism about scientific kinds. 
Human minds and disciplinary projects are part of reality, so (the thought goes) dis-
cipline-relativity does not prevent scientific kinds from being real kinds.
How does the theory of reference fit in with the philosophy of science approach? 
Slater (2015) accepts that there is a “semantic cost” (p. 402) to his SPC account in 
the sense that it is unlikely to generate any claims about how reference works for 
natural kind terms. While I think it is true that SPC kinds lack the sort of metaphysi-
cal structure that can ground a direct reference theory (more on this later), the SPC 
account, as well as related accounts discussed in this section, does have implica-
tions for how reference to scientific kinds works. First, there should be some referen-
tial relation between scientific categories and causal structures. Boyd (1999, 2021) 
rightly insists that reference to causal structures is needed to account for the induc-
tive and explanatory successes in a discipline. But if scientific kinds are character-
ized (at least in part) relative to specifications of explanatory projects, relevance, and 
other descriptive content, then the way scientific kind terms refer to causal structures 
must be explained at least in part through some sort of descriptive theory of refer-
ence. For example, Boyd (2021) develops a more nuanced account of reference for 
the classificatory terms of a discipline. He sees reference as a dialectical process 
rather than an event determined at a specific point in time. Over time, uses of clas-
sificatory terms in a discipline interact with relevant causal structures in ways that 
explain inferential and explanatory successes. It is neither the case that the external 
causal structures determine reference, nor that explicit definitions determine refer-
ence. Rather, in successful cases, there is a gradual convergence between the uses 
of terms in a discipline and the identification of causal structures that underwrite 
the inferential and explanatory success of those terms. In this process, it is clear that 
descriptive content from disciplinary matrices plays an essential role in the conver-
gence between classificatory concepts and causal structures.
7 See for example arguments in Boyd (2021) Chang (2016) and Khalidi (2013).
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The above accounts (among others) constitute what I take to be a single approach 
to kinds.8 There is significant variety in the accounts generated in this approach, 
but also important commonalities. What unifies them as an approach is a central 
concern with classification as it is practiced in science, and with the epistemic value 
of scientific classificatory practices. Particular accounts of scientific kinds vary with 
respect to how scientific kinds are characterized, the extent to which they are tied to 
causal structures or micro-structures, and how broad or permissive the notion of a 
scientific kind is. They also resemble each other in important ways. The following 
is a good summary. It is itself a property cluster, characterizing the accounts in the 
category philosophy of science approach. I do not claim that every account in this 
approach must or does adopt all of these.
(a) Discipline-relativity Many philosophers in this approach (including all those dis-
cussed here) accept that scientific kinds cannot be separated from the disciplines 
in which they are embedded. As Betzler (forthcoming) argues, domain-relativity 
allows these accounts to assess the normative appropriateness of scientific kinds, 
by indexing kinds to domains that specify relevant phenomena and appropriate 
methods.
(b) Realism The realism of the philosophy of science approach is based on the idea 
that scientific kinds are embedded in successful scientific practices. While most 
profess to realism, accounts vary with respect to how responsive to real causal 
structures scientific kinds need to be. In some of the more pragmatic views 
(e.g., Chang, Magnus), the empirical success of the practices in which kinds are 
embedded is sufficient to ground their reality.
(c) Pluralism, permissiveness, and crosscutting kinds There are varying degrees of 
pluralism and permissiveness, depending on the inclusiveness of kind concepts, 
but some degree pluralism and the acceptance of some crosscutting is a conse-
quence of discipline-relativity.
(d) Functional kinds and multiply realized kinds Many accounts do not require 
micro-structural criteria for individuating scientific kinds, and thus accept 
functional and multiply realized scientific kinds, which are individuated at the 
macro-level.
(e) Anti-essentialism Accounts in the philosophy of science approach have a general 
antipathy toward essentialism. I have not focused on this feature so far, because 
it is often hard to tell what form of essentialism is being rejected. The discussion 
in the next section of three kinds of essentialism adopted in the philosophy of 
language approach will help to illuminate the issue.
Once we go down the path of focusing on the roles of classification in scientific 
practice, our account of scientific kinds will likely take on many of these character-
istics. By the end of this paper, I aim to establish that however accounts develop in 
8 Betzler’s (forthcoming) characterization of “enthusiastic accounts” of kinds is substantially the same 
family that I place in the philosophy of science approach. For Betzler, enthusiastic accounts are charac-
terized by their permissiveness, practice-orientation, epistemology-first stance, and expanded naturalism.
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this approach, its scientific kinds will not be the sort of entities that can be plugged 
into a direct reference theory.
3  The philosophy of language approach
What I call the philosophy of language approach starts with the assumption that 
some version of a direct reference theory for natural kind terms is correct. A 
direct reference theory is an account of natural kind terms that is committed to the 
following:
1. Natural kind terms are not descriptive Some direct reference theorists accept 
a certain amount of descriptive content in order to secure reference for natural 
kind terms. But a direct reference theory rejects any account according to which 
descriptions both constitute the meaning of a natural kind term and play a sub-
stantial role in determining reference.
2. Natural kind terms are rigid designators Rigidity is not nearly as straightforward 
for natural kind terms as it is for proper names. Consequently, there are different 
accounts of rigidity for natural kind terms.
3. A causal theory explains how reference is secured For natural kind terms, refer-
ence is normally secured through samples with which speakers are in contact.
One of the attractions of direct reference theories is their apparent naturalism. 
Rather than explaining reference in terms of “senses” or “intensions,” whereby 
speakers grasp a description that determines an extension, reference is explained 
through causal relations with referents. By extending the direct reference theory 
from proper names to natural kind terms, philosophers hoped to provide a natu-
ralistic account of the meanings of terms that ground scientific explanation and 
induction.
A non-descriptional proper name like “Aristotle” picks out a certain human 
being, regardless of whether the descriptions typically associated with the name are 
true of him. The name “Aristotle” causally latches onto a person and rigidly refers 
to him in every possible world where he exists, including worlds where Aristotle 
never becomes famous for anything. Some essentialist view is needed here to iden-
tify Aristotle across possible worlds—that is, something about Aristotle must be the 
same across possible worlds. For Kripke, “Aristotle” refers to the person (if there is 
such) in any possible world who originated from a particular egg and sperm. Thus, 
he adopts the “essentiality of origin” as the ontology that underwrites his account of 
the rigidity of proper names. Some version of essentialism is similarly required to 
underwrite the rigidity of natural kind terms. Different versions of rigidity employ 
different versions of essentialism. “Essentialism” about kinds is often rejected in the 
philosophy of science approach. As there are many possible essentialist theses that 
may be rejected, it is worth examining the essentialist theses that are employed by 
direct reference theories to see where tensions may arise between essentialism and 
scientific kinds. In what follows, I identify three essentialist theses by their role in 
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supporting rigid designation for natural kind terms. Each account of essentialism 
and rigid designation will be assessed by considering its implications for scientific 
kinds, and by how well the resulting account succeeds in securing reference.
It was noted early on that rigid designation cannot work the same way for natural 
kind terms as it does for proper names.9 The thing designated by a proper name is 
its extension. The extension of a general term is normally thought to be the set of 
things to which it applies. Because there are different water samples and different 
tigers in different possible worlds, if natural kind terms designate their extensions, 
they are not rigid. The most commonly suggested alternate designatum for a natu-
ral kind term is an abstract property or universal (the kind), rather than the set of 
things that exemplify the kind.10 The first two versions of essentialism discussed 
below—Essentialism A and Essentialism B—make this move. The commitment 
to abstracta may already be too un-naturalistic for some, but it would be hasty to 
reject an account of rigid designation on that basis. Properties play important roles 
in explanation and induction, and we ought to leave science free to appeal to proper-
ties without needing to sort out their ontology. A third alternative, Essentialism C, 
does not require reference to abstracta. In what follows, I consider how each of these 
essentialisms attempts to show how “water” is a rigid designator.
Essentialism A: “Water” designates the abstract kind water in every possible 
world, water being essentially the kind water (Salmon, 1981, 2003).
This version of essentialism may seem trivial. For Salmon, it is trivial, and that is 
its virtue because then no controversial essentialist claim is entailed by the direct 
reference theory. It makes no claim about what natural kind essences are like, and 
it makes no claim about individual essences of the sort that would ground individ-
ual persistence conditions. A consequence of this version of essentialism is that all 
simple kind terms are rigid designators. Just as “water” rigidly designates the water 
kind, “lawyer” rigidly designates the lawyer kind and “beer” rigidly designates the 
beer kind. This is not to say that natural kinds cannot be distinguished from other 
kinds, but that the distinction is independent of semantic theory. On this account, the 
direct reference theory has little to say about what is distinctive in the categories that 
ground scientific explanation and induction. Salmon may not object to this conse-
quence, since his whole point was to reign in the direct reference theory by showing 
that it does not have controversial metaphysical implications.
Does Essentialism A succeed in showing how reference to a natural kind is 
secured? Without some additional apparatus, it does not, since it has a “qua” prob-
lem. This is the problem (so designated by Sterelny, 1983), of how a causal refer-
ence fixing for a natural kind term can zero in on the “right” kind while excluding 
others. The exemplars we are in contact with belong to many kinds, not all of which 
are natural. How does “water” get to designate the water kind and not the saltwater 
9 See for example Cook (1980), Donnellan (1983), Forbes (1981), and Salmon (1981).
10 Mondadori (1978) and LaPorte (2013) think the extension of a natural kind term is this abstract 




kind? How does “tiger” get to designate the tiger kind and not the predator kind? 
Salmon (1981) proposes what he takes to be two “axioms” of “natural kind theory” 
(which is independent of semantic theory): that an organism can belong to at most 
one species kind (p. 133), and that a substance can belong to at most one substance 
kind (p. 137). These are supposed to distinguish natural kinds from non-natural 
kinds since something can belong to multiple non-natural kinds—someone can be 
both a philosopher and coach—but can only belong to one species. In addition, to 
address the qua problem, we can add a minor semantic modification to the direct 
reference theory that Devitt and Sterelny (1999) employ for this purpose; terms like 
“water” and “tiger” need to be introduced with the intention that they be natural 
kind terms. Call this semantic modification SM. SM incorporates some descriptive 
content into natural kind terms, but only enough to stipulate that a term will func-
tion semantically as a natural kind term. If we add these supplementary claims (one 
semantic and one extra-semantic) to the trivial essentialist claim, the term “water” 
can pick out the only substance natural kind (if there is one) of which our exemplar 
is an instance.
The supplementary claims from natural kind theory, which are needed to solve 
the qua problem for Essentialism A, are deeply problematic for scientific kinds. In 
order to accommodate the causal structures that ground explanation and induction, 
scientific classifications include crosscutting kinds that violate Salmon’s “axioms”. 
The kind Newtonian fluid is explanatory, projectible, and subject to law-like gen-
eralizations, but is identified at a more abstract level than chemical composition. It 
is a substance kind that crosscuts chemical kinds. If we want our theory of natural 
kinds to be about scientific categories that ground explanation and induction, we 
need to recognize such crosscutting kinds. The axiom that an organism belongs to 
at most one species is more plausible, but given that there are many biological cat-
egories besides species—including other taxonomic ranks—the axiom can solve 
the qua problem for species names only if it is further stipulated that in introducing 
kind terms for organisms speakers are always intending to designate species. This is 
not plausible for ordinary speakers, who more often talk about genera, and it places 
severe limitations on what could count as kinds of organisms. There are also many 
more scientific kinds in biology besides species—including kinds of genes, homolo-
gies, and ecological niches. Either these will not be natural kinds, or we will be 
introducing new axioms for every class of kinds. It is hard to see what would moti-
vate such principles other than a need to make a particular semantic theory work. 
Although Salmon is keen on separating natural kind theory from semantic theory, 
his axioms of natural kind theory place unnecessary constraints on scientific kinds.
Essentialism B: “Water” designates the abstract kind water, a property that 
has an essential underlying nature (the  H2O micro-structure) (LaPorte, 2004, 
2013; Soames, 2002, 2007).
Essentialism B claims that natural kinds have less trivial essences, and that natural 
kind terms pick out these essences. It is a matter of the causal semantics of natu-
ral kind terms that they pick out underlying, usually unknown, natures, which are 
thought to explain or unify the observable features by which we identify typical 
samples of the kind. In every world where a kind is instantiated, all its members 
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have this underlying nature. According to the causal theory, “water”, as introduced 
into the language, picks out the underlying physical structure  H2O, so that in rig-
idly designating the water kind, “water” picks out  H2O in every possible world. It is 
still not obvious that rigidity is a distinctive feature of natural kind terms, since the 
account does not rule out that “lawyer” rigidly designates the lawyer kind. (LaPorte 
(2004) accepts this.) There is, however, something semantically distinctive about 
natural kind terms, and hence about natural kinds. For Soames (2007), what makes 
a kind natural is that it is designated by a natural kind term, and natural kind terms 
are introduced by stipulations that fix the reference to underlying explanatory traits 
rather than to identifying features (pp. 339–340). Natural kind terms have a dis-
tinctive dual-level semantics, whereby observable features are used to secure refer-
ence, but reference gets fixed to underlying structures, which mark the boundaries 
between natural kinds. The essentialism involved in this account is the claim that 
natural kinds have underlying natures or basic physical constitutions, which can be 
picked out by contact with samples, and are such that all and only things with these 
natures belong to the kind. Kind essences are often conceived as micro-structural, 
though LaPorte (2004) accepts historical essences for species. Like Essentialism 
A, this account involves no essentialist claim regarding individuals of the sort that 
would ground individual persistence conditions. The essentialist claim of Essential-
ism B is that something would cease to belong to the kind K if it lost its K-essence, 
not that it would cease to exist without it. And Essentialism B specifies the sort of 
thing that would count as a K-essence (e.g., micro-structure, ancestral tree, etc.).
This account of what and how natural kind terms designate incorporates SM, so 
that speakers must have certain beliefs and intentions at least so far as they can stip-
ulate that the term is supposed to refer to a natural kind. As we saw in discussing 
Essentialism A, SM goes some way, but not the whole way, toward addressing the 
qua problem. To go the rest of the way, the account needs to show how natural kind 
terms fix on the “right” underlying properties—those that are in fact the essences of 
the natural kinds designated by natural kind terms. For Soames (2002, 2007), sub-
stance natural kind terms can do this because instances of them have unique basic 
physical constitutions, which unify and explain the identifying features associated 
with the substance and are essential to the substance.
The underlying structure that is essential to the kind water is presumed to be 
molecular—being composed of  H2O. A number of philosophers11 have pointed out 
that this claim is problematic. A mere collection of  H2O molecules would not gen-
erate the characteristic features of water. Rather, a more complex story, including 
a constant transfer of ions among molecules, as well as a trace number of isotopes 
in addition to  H2O, generate the characteristic macroscopic properties.12 This could 
be understood to suggest merely that we need to refine the simplistic description of 
the essence of water that philosophers typically express. But the problem is deeper 
11 Hendry (2006), Needham (2000), van Brakel (2000), and Weisberg (2006).
12 According to Hendry (2006) “macroscopic bodies of water are complex and dynamic congeries of dif-
ferent molecular species, in which there is a constant dissociation of individual molecules, reassociation 
of ions, and formation, growth, and dissociation of oligomers” (p. 870).
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than that and goes to the heart of the qua problem. It is that micro-structure can-
not do the work of individuating kinds independently of macro-level descriptions. 
Molecular composition offers an alluringly tidy way to carve nature. But if you 
are interested in the substance water and why it behaves as it does, then molecu-
lar composition carves in the wrong place. Needham (2000) argues that “there is a 
complexity and variety at the micro-level which is unified only if seen in relation to 
single macroscopically distinguished kinds” (p. 13). van Brakel (2000) argues for a 
macroscopic account of chemical substances on similar grounds. The problem is not 
that we cannot describe the complexity that informs the identity of water entirely 
in micro-terms. And there is no denying that micro-level descriptions offer illumi-
nating explanations of macro-properties, such as the viscosity of water. The point 
is that those micro-level features are identified relative to the phenomena we are 
looking to explain. Given an antecedently recognized kind water, we can look for 
micro-structural mechanisms that explain the macro-properties characteristic of the 
kind. Nothing unifies these micro-structural mechanisms except that they explain 
features individuated macroscopically. Even if we identify water with a more com-
plex micro-structure, this micro-structure would not be a unique basic physical con-
stitution for any particular instance of water. A particular water sample has multiple 
and varied micro-properties. Only some of these explain the antecedently identified 
macro-properties characteristic of water. In cases where we can refer to relevant 
micro-structures without (yet) being able to describe them, we do so by antecedently 
isolating kinds and employing macro-level characterizations of them for essential 
semantic work. Because of the complexity and variety at the micro-level, the seman-
tic work of the macro-level characterization does not fall away when we isolate rel-
evant aspects of micro-structure. Even if we were to use entirely micro-structural 
language to describe water, we would be isolating those micro-features that are most 
illuminating as explanations of the macro-features.
The problem for Essentialism B is that in order to secure rigid designation, it is 
not sufficient that we can discover underlying structures (or historical properties) 
that necessitate that something with these “essences” has certain macro-properties 
(or belongs to a certain population). The “essence” has to be unique—the only 
basic physical constitution (or fundamental historical property) of instances of a 
kind, independently of how they are categorized and all the descriptive content that 
goes into that categorization. Physical and historical complexity make this assump-
tion highly implausible. To address the qua problem and thus fix reference onto the 
right micro-structures (or historical properties), we need to incorporate macro-level 
descriptions, and employ them for substantive semantic work. Thus for Essentialism 
B, a full solution to the qua problem requires more than minor modifications to the 
direct reference theory; it requires full-blown descriptive content.
Essentialism C: “Water” rigidly applies to water samples, each of which is 
a water sample in every possible world where it exists (Cook, 1980; Devitt, 
2005; Devitt & Sterelny, 1999).
Rather than treating kind terms as “name-like” designators of abstract kinds, this 
view treats them as general terms that are true of, or apply to, multiple objects. 
While kinds have different members in different worlds, if a kind is natural, its 
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members belong to their kind essentially, so that the natural kind term applies to 
them in every world where they exist. Just as a proper name, say, “Aristotle” refers 
to a particular baby identified at a baptism by his essential origin, upon ostensively 
introducing a kind term such as “water,” the term applies to samples identified by 
properties that are not only common to the samples (or most of them), but also 
essential to each (or most of them). In this way, “water” rigidly applies to everything 
in any possible world with that essential property, even if we do not know what that 
property is. This strategy makes rigidity a distinctive feature of natural kind terms, 
since the members of non-natural kinds, say lawyers, are not essentially lawyers.
Devitt and Sterelny (1999) are among the few direct reference theorists who take 
seriously the qua problem, and they do not claim to have fully solved it. Nonethe-
less, Essentialism C addresses the qua problem to some extent. Like Essentialism 
B, the account incorporates as part of the semantics of natural kind terms the inten-
tion that they be natural kind terms (SM), exhibiting a dual-level semantics such that 
samples are identified by one set of properties while underlying properties individu-
ate the kind. In addition, Essentialism C postulates sufficient metaphysical appara-
tus to narrow down the possible underlying properties that could serve to fix the 
reference of a natural kind term. Though the underlying properties of an individual 
substance or organism are complex and multi-leveled, we can rule out those that are 
not among its essential properties, and thus not relevant to its being a member of a 
natural kind. The aspects of structure that inform liquidity or salinity (even if all our 
samples are liquid salt water) are not what the term “water” fixes onto, since these 
are not essential to any particular water sample. Essentialism C could go all the way 
to solving the qua problem if we accept as well the view that any object can belong 
to at most one natural kind. If this were the case, natural kinds would provide a 
unique partitioning of the world, carving nature at a unique set of joints. Call this 
claim uniqueness. Adding uniqueness to any of the three Essentialist theses would 
solve the qua problem.
Few philosophers accept uniqueness, however, and for good reason. It severely 
limits the kinds that count as natural, and it surely discounts the vast majority of sci-
entific kinds. Devitt acknowledges that things can belong to multiple natural kinds, 
with different sets of essential properties relevant to each. An organism may be a 
Eurasian otter, a mammal, a vertebrate, etc., and according to Devitt is essentially 
each of these things, with different sets of essential properties relevant to each clas-
sification. There is a weaker thesis than uniqueness that does have contemporary 
advocates, and that can help here. Brian Ellis (2001) maintains that “if anything 
belongs to two natural kinds, these natural kinds must both be members of a com-
mon genus” (p. 20). Call this claim hierarchy. Hierarchy does not recognize cross-
cutting kinds but allows for nested hierarchies of natural kinds ranging from more 
general to more specific. Hierarchy narrows the possibilities for what essences a nat-
ural kind term can refer to. Now we need only add, in addition to SM and hierarchy, 
content that specifies the hierarchical level of the kind we mean to refer to. This may 
be done by changing the sample set to include or exclude certain samples, changing 
the relevant macroscopic features that are used to pick out the samples, or adding a 
description of the category of the natural kind (e.g., a specification of what is meant 
by “biological species” or “chemical substance”).
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This position can be seen as a “compromise view” that both adds descriptive 
content to the semantics side and places restrictions on the metaphysics side, so 
that a natural kind term can pick out a definite referent. As with many compro-
mises, it may satisfy few, being both too descriptional to be a genuine direct ref-
erence theory, and not sufficiently accommodating of scientific practices by rul-
ing out crosscutting kinds. The lesson to be drawn from this is that the project of 
solving the qua problem for the direct reference theory, and the project of accom-
modating scientific inductive and explanatory projects, often work against each 
other. In order to solve the qua problem, we need to restrict what counts as a nat-
ural kind. In order to recognize the variety of causally efficacious and projectible 
scientific kinds, we need allow for pluralistic and crosscutting kinds that make the 
qua problem intractable.
The most fundamental problem with Essentialism C, however, is that for most 
scientific kinds, it is not plausible that instances of them belong to their kind essen-
tially. Essentialism C assumes that samples of  H2O could not exist without being 
 H2O, that samples of elements such as gold could not exist without being gold, and 
that an organism could not exist without belonging to the species that it belongs to. 
Given the relative ease with which compounds can be split, it is not obvious why we 
should think that water samples are essentially water samples. The rarity of nuclear 
transmutation in readily observable regions of the universe makes the essentialist 
claim about elements seem more inviting, but it is no more plausible. Devitt (2008) 
defends intrinsic criteria for species membership, which would make the essentialist 
claim about organisms intuitive. However, if one adopts one of the relational spe-
cies concepts (e.g., ecological, biological), membership in a species is a contingent 
matter, as LaPorte (2004) explains. A new species can emerge when a splinter group 
becomes geographically isolated from a larger population, resulting in adaptations 
to new ecological conditions and/or reproductive isolation. For any organism in the 
larger population, there are possible worlds in which it is in the splinter group and 
worlds in which it is not.
The philosophy of language approach is unified by the assumption that some ver-
sion of a direct reference theory applies to natural kind terms, and by the effort to 
understand natural kinds in the context of such a semantic theory. There is signifi-
cant variety among the accounts in this approach; I have focused on the different 
versions of essentialism that are offered to support the claim that natural kind terms 
are non-descriptional rigid designators. While there are other kinds of essentialism 
that are independent of rigid designation, and while each of these three essentialisms 
has variations, these three kinds of essentialism exhaust the logical possibilities for 
what is needed for natural kind terms to be rigid designators. This is not something 
I can prove, but I am aware of no other possibilities. Each of them has to address 
the qua problem. Essentialism A does this with the help of multiple substantive 
claims from natural kind theory, each of which would rule out crosscutting kinds. 
Essentialism B does this by adopting the claim that instances of natural kinds have 
unique fundamental properties independently of how they are classified. Essential-
ism C addresses the qua problem by claiming that instances of natural kinds belong 
to their kinds essentially. None of these claims is attractive from the point of view of 
the philosophy of science approach.
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4  Tensions and compatibilities
4.1  Essentialism
Accounts in the philosophy of science approach often claim to be anti-essentialist, 
though it is not always clear which essentialist claims are being rejected. Some may 
reject essentialism on the grounds that scientific categories defined in terms of nec-
essary and sufficient conditions are not the norm in science. That version of essen-
tialism plays no role in the philosophy of language approach, which from the start 
was eager to dispense with such definitions for natural kind concepts. Do the essen-
tialist theses that are employed in the philosophy of language approach conflict with 
the predominant theses of the philosophy of science approach? There is no conflict 
with Essentialism A, which just says that each natural kind is essentially the kind 
that it is. It is a trivial form of essentialism that applies to abstract kinds generally. 
There remains the metaphysical question about whether scientific kinds and proper-
ties are abstract; if they are, then Essentialism A could be true of them. My objec-
tions to Essentialism A concerned auxiliary claims (Salmon’s “axioms” of natural 
kind theory) that can be employed to solve the qua problem, but that are not plau-
sible theses for scientific kinds. If scientific kinds have essences in the trivial sense, 
nothing rules out our being able to characterize at least some of those essences in 
terms of molecular composition or ancestral tree, of the sort that Essentialism B 
postulates. It is not Essentialism B itself that runs into conflict with the philosophy 
of science approach; it is the claim, needed for natural kind terms to be non-descrip-
tional rigid designators, that instances of kinds have unique fundamental properties 
independently of the disciplinary frameworks that inform relevant questions and 
phenomena of interest. So far as Essentialisms A and B are concerned, the antipathy 
of the philosophy of science approach toward essentialism is not warranted. There 
are genuine conflicts, however, with the additional claims about natural kinds that 
are introduced to support rigid designation.
Essentialism C cannot be maintained as a general account of scientific kinds 
that are explanatory and projectible. There are too many such kinds for which it is 
not plausible that their instances belong to them essentially. However, one should 
not abandon the idea of individuals having essential properties without which they 
could not persist; the possibility of persisting individuals requires such individual 
essences. The challenge is to find grounds for individuals having properties essen-
tially, independently of the ways we categorize them. Otherwise, our claims about 
persistence will appear to be dependent on conventional ways of classifying things, 
like the judgment that a bronze statue persists through oxidation but is destroyed 
upon melting. Individual essences of the sort that would ground persistence con-
ditions as well as “natural” classifications would really need to be mind-independ-
ent. Identifying such individual essences will take serious metaphysical work, and 
if successful could potentially provide an account of mind-independent “natural” 
kinds. But such an account will likely be limited in scope, for example to elementary 
 Synthese
1 3
particles that do not undergo change.13 Essentialism C’s commitment to individual 
essences by itself presents no conflict with the philosophy of science approach. It is 
the essential properties that it postulates in order to ground rigid designation that are 
implausible.
4.2  Realism
Philosophers across both approaches claim to be realists about natural kinds, so real-
ism would appear to be a point of convergence. But “realism” is hardly univocal 
in philosophy, and its use in the natural kinds literatures is no exception. The two 
approaches use conceptions of realism that are quite different. Essentialisms A and B 
each add auxiliary claims in order to solve the qua problem and establish that natu-
ral kind terms are rigid designators. These claims posit objective, mind-independent 
classificatory structures, by stipulating either that each thing belongs to exactly one 
(category of) natural kind (Essentialism A), or that each thing has unique fundamen-
tal properties (Essentialism B) that determine its kind. Essentialism C also posits 
mind-independent classificatory structures, though it builds this into the essentialist 
claim that these are the properties that individuals could not exist without. Call this 
commitment to mind-independent structures that carve nature along a single set of 
joints natural kind realism. Natural kind realism grounds rigid designation for natu-
ral kind terms by providing structures that natural kind terms can refer to without 
descriptional content and while avoiding the qua problem.
The dominant accounts in the philosophy of science approach reject the mind-
independent natural joints characteristic of natural kind realism; consequently, the 
kinds they identify do not have the sort of metaphysical structures that can ground 
rigid designation. The move toward pluralism, and toward accepting discipline-rela-
tive kinds, crosscutting kinds, functional kinds, and multiply realizable kinds means 
that if you want scientific kind terms to be non-descriptional rigid designators, you 
will have an intractable qua problem. If we drop the commitment to a direct refer-
ence theory for natural kind terms, natural kind realism loses much of its motivation. 
Nonetheless, “realism” is an important issue in the philosophy of science literature. 
But the realism at stake is scientific realism. Scientific realism requires that true sci-
entific theories, and the concepts and categories they employ, are responsive to real 
aspects of the world. On the face of it, scientific realism does not require that such 
theories reflect a unique partitioning of the world. The realism debate within the 
philosophy of science approach tends to focus on differences in the breadth or per-
missiveness of kind concepts, and on the extent to which accounts are pragmatic. 
The more pragmatic accounts require only that a scientific kind be useful for sci-
entific practices, while less pragmatic accounts require that they be connected to 
causal structures or mechanisms. Some worry that the more pragmatic accounts 
lack the metaphysical structure to ground the epistemic value of scientific kinds as 
13 But see Crane (2012) for a defense of individual essential properties of organisms.
1 3
Synthese 
projectible, explanatory, and inductively powerful.14 Adopting natural kind realism 
would be one way to ground the epistemic claims, though it is an unpopular one 
in this approach. The costs in terms of developing a widely applicable and useful 
theory would be significant.
4.3  Semantics
I presented three theses of direct reference theories, and raised problems for the first 
two, that natural kind terms are non-descriptive rigid designators. The third, that ref-
erence is secured through samples with which speakers are causally related, contains 
a potentially interesting insight. There is a good case to be made that many scientific 
terms have a dual-level semantic structure such that they are able to refer to hidden 
features of the world before the science catches up and can describe those features 
explicitly. I discuss here two categories of scientific terms that appear to behave in 
this way. In each case, the kind is not individuated by hidden features but by observ-
able ones. The qua problem shows that in order for these terms to latch onto the 
right explanatory features, the right explananda need to be part of their descriptive 
content, so that such terms are in fact descriptional.
The standard way that a new species is named is by a sample, officially recorded 
and named in a museum. A species name refers to the species to which the sample 
belongs, even if we don’t know much more about that species (though identification 
of a genus is required for an official binomial species name). For this to identify a 
particular population of organisms, we need not only the intention that our name be 
a species term (SM), but we need to know what sort of thing a species is in order 
to identify a kind with an essence. A baptism for a newly discovered species could 
stipulate that “Genus species” is the name of the monophyletic group including 
this sample and originating with the most recent speciation event. What counts as a 
speciation event depends on the species concept adopted. There are several options 
(e.g., biological, ecological, phylogenetic), adopted in various fields of biology for 
various explanatory purposes. One needs a particular explanatory purpose to pick 
out a particular population by a species baptism. If that is left open, the name may 
not latch onto any determinate population.
Hendry (2010) argues that “something like Putnam’s account of reference” (p. 
138) works for the names of chemical elements (though probably not for com-
pounds). In particular, nuclear charge, rather than atomic weight, determined the 
extensions of scientific terms for chemical elements long before the discovery of 
atomic nuclear charges. This is because chemists in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries had sufficiently clear concepts of chemical behaviors and reactions, and 
a sufficiently clear concept of chemical composition, that their names for elements 
(Laviosier’s “hydrogen” and “oxygen” for example) tracked the explanatory grounds 
of such chemical reactions and behaviors. It was discovered only in the twentieth 
century that nuclear charge, rather than atomic weight, is the appropriate explanatory 
14 See Betzler (forthcoming) for a helpful discussion of this point.
 Synthese
1 3
ground. There is no qua problem in this account, precisely because the descriptive 
content of the eighteenth and nineteenth century scientific element names included 
a conception of chemical behavior and composition, so that the terms could fix on 
atomic numbers as the underlying explanations. In this story, that descriptive con-
tent plays a significant semantic role.
Though some scientific terms exhibit this dual-level semantics, it is not a general 
feature of scientific terms. Many scientific terms are introduced and used as explic-
itly descriptional, in such a way that their definitions express essential features of the 
kind, without appeal to further “underlying” properties. In general, any kind term 
that is introduced by scientists (not adopted from pre-scientific usage) and given an 
explicit definition will not exhibit a dual-level semantics. Nor will those scientific 
kind terms that are defined at the macro-level, or as multiply realizable functional 
kinds. If philosophers of language were to drop the first two theses of the direct 
reference theory, that natural kind terms are non-descriptional and rigid designators, 
the possibility remains for fruitful work on the third, as an account of the seman-
tics of at least some scientific terms. This work could provide useful insights on 
how imprecise scientific terms can identify causal structures, as well as on meaning 
change and meaning constancy though the development of theories.
5  Conclusion
I have shown that a significant bifurcation in the natural kinds literature should be 
acknowledged, and that it warrants a terminological clarification. The philosophy 
of science approach would do well to accept that it has a distinct project from that 
of the philosophy of language approach, recognizing that its scientific kinds are not 
the sort of entities that can be plugged into a direct reference theory for kind terms. 
Discussions of “realism” should be clarified so that philosophers may comfortably 
reject the natural kind realism that postulates mind-independent classificatory struc-
tures corresponding to scientific kinds, and focus on significant debates about scien-
tific realism that are relevant to controversies about the nature of scientific kinds. At 
the same time, there is no need to commit to anti-essentialism, at least not without 
clarification about which essentialism one is anti-. Many common versions of essen-
tialism are entirely consistent with the dominant theses of the philosophy of science 
approach. In addition, there is no need to reject all mind-independent classificatory 
structures, even if such mind-independence is neither required nor plausible for most 
scientific kinds that concern philosophers in this approach.
The assumption that natural kind terms are rigid designators, which I character-
ized as central to the philosophy of language approach, should be rejected. This 
means that as an approach to natural kinds, the philosophy of language approach 
ought to be abandoned. The commitment to this aspect of the direct reference the-
ory has probably hindered progress on its genuine insight that some scientific terms 
exhibit a dual-level semantics, referring to hidden features before science is able to 
describe those features explicitly. By dropping natural kind realism and scaling back 
on the generality of this semantic feature, helpful progress could be made on things 
like meaning change and meaning constancy through theory development.
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Lastly, there remains the metaphysical project of investigating kinds and objects 
that are natural in the sense of being independent of human classificatory schemes 
and explanatory projects. This will involve looking for naturalistic grounds for 
essential properties and persistence conditions that are independent of how things 
are classified and could thus ground a natural classification. Such kinds, as elusive 
as they may be, can with justification retain the name natural kinds. My recommen-
dation is to cease looking for such kinds in a theory of reference, and to recognize 
that the discipline-relative scientific kinds employed in explanations and induc-
tive inferences are not natural in this sense. They are real kinds that are sensitive 
to causal structures with which we interact epistemically, but they don’t engage the 
deep metaphysical issues regarding individual essences or persistence conditions.
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